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Abstract
Pensioners have increasingly more control over their income streams as a result of
pension reforms, which gives them more freedom to save for their old age. We de-
vise an experiment where subjects face a life-cycle optimization task with lifetime
uncertainty and a given lifetime income. The aims are to test whether subjects’
saving and consumption behaviour is affected by: (i) the steepness of the income
profile; and (ii) the freedom to choose the steepness of the income profile before the
optimization task. In general, subjects’ consumption decisions deviate systematically
from the optimal ones in the sense that they are overly sensitive to current income
and financial wealth. Subject behavior is unaffected by the steepness of the income.
When subjects are given such a flexibility their consumption decisions are relatively
more sensitive to current income and financial wealth.
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1 Introduction
With the ongoing transition from mandatory pension arrangements to individual accounts
and private pension plans that are based on voluntary participation, workers have access
to a wider menu of alternatives to finance their old age consumption. This trend shifts
the responsibilities from governments and pension funds to pensioners and gives them
more control over their income profiles.1 Typically, pension arrangements are considered
to be a useful way to smooth income over ones lifetime, presumably under the assumption
that this helps in realizing the optimal consumption path. Despite the fact that pension
investments constitute a sizable portion of life-time resources, little is known about the
actual behavioural impact of pension arrangements on economic decisions. Given the
reforms of the pension systems and the resulting changes in income streams it becomes
increasingly important to know how people react to these transforms. In the real world
it is rather difficult to investigate these issues as pension arrangements are not easily
comparable. For instance, it is hard to account for the risks involved in different pension
plans and the expectations of participants regarding their future benefits and contributions
are mostly unknown. Another complicating factor in reality is that there often is a lack
of control, i.e. many variables may be subject to changes simultaneously, and therefore
typically a proper counterfactual is missing. A laboratory experiment, on the other hand,
offers the opportunity to control these elements to a large extent. It allows for controlled
variation such that it is possible to examine and isolate the effect of a change in one of the
relevant variables, while keeping other economic circumstances constant. That is why we
investigate these issues in a laboratory experiment. Such a controlled setting allows us to
examine the role of pensions in facilitating consumption-smoothing and the consequences
of shifting responsibilities to pensioners.
1According to OECD (2008), countries with large private pension markets relative to GDP include the
Netherlands (149.1 %), Iceland (147.4 %), Denmark (140.6 %), the United States (124 %), Australia (119.5
%) and Canada (103.4 %).
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In order to do so we have designed an experiment in which individuals face an op-
timization task under uncertain lifetimes. In this framework, we examine the interplay
of individuals’ consumption decisions and income streams. We examine whether pension
schemes that bring the income profile closer to the optimal consumption path have an
effect on subjects’ decisions. The second aim of our paper is to investigate whether the
freedom to choose the pension schedule affects subjects’ behaviour compared to the case
where pension parameters are exogenously given.
For these purposes, we devised two treatments. In the first treatment, subjects are
randomly given one of four possible income profiles. The optimal consumption path is the
same in all four cases. However, these income profiles differ from each other in terms of
how close they are to the optimal consumption path. When an income profile is further
away from the optimal consumption path, the subject could benefit more from consumption
smoothing. In other words, he should rely more on his private savings to achieve the optimal
consumption path. In contrast to the first treatment, where subjects are confronted with
only one of the exogenously determined income profiles, in the second treatment subjects
can choose their preferred income profile. Hence, in the second treatment subjects first
choose one of four income profiles and then make their consumption and saving decisions
given the chosen income stream.
A large part of the traditional economic literature relies on the assumption that people
are rational and that optimization models can accurately explain various economic deci-
sions. Behavioural economics, on the other hand, suggests that people may not always
behave rationally and make optimal decisions. Moreover, individuals not only often be-
have irrationally but they also tend to do so in a systematic way. Consequently, people
are likely to be predictably irrational (Ariely, 2011). A number of empirical studies indeed
argue that the forward-looking optimization assumption might be invalid in the case of
life cycle decisions. These studies suggest that when individuals make consumption and
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investment decisions they might use rules of thumb instead of optimal decision rules, espe-
cially when the cognitive cost of optimization is large compared to the utility benefits from
optimization (Browning and Crossley, 2001).2 Also experimental evidence suggests that
in the case of life cycle optimization problems, consumption and saving decisions may be
systematically biased, possibly due to the fact that rule-of-thumb behaviour is cognitively
less costly than optimization. Biases that have been documented in the literature include
agents’ oversensitivity to current financial wealth (Ballinger et al., 2003) and oversensitivity
to their current income (Carbone and Hey, 2004).
In our setup the income profile, and thus the pension size, has no effect on the opti-
mal consumption path and expected welfare. Therefore, according to standard economic
theory agents are expected to make the same consumption decisions, irrespective of the in-
come profile. In other words, rational, pay-off maximizing individuals should be indifferent
between receiving one income stream or the other and behave similarly in all situations.
The flexibility of choosing the income stream beforehand should also not influence their
decisions. However, if people are irrational and make systemic errors, as behavioural eco-
nomics suggests, some streams may lead to better outcomes than others. By comparing
decisions across exogenously given income profiles (within the first treatment), we can
explore whether or not individuals behave the same given different income streams. Sec-
ondly, by comparing decisions across treatments, we can investigate whether the freedom
of choosing the pension size has a significant impact on subject behaviour.
Subjects’ behaviour in the experiment indicates evidence in favor of systemic devia-
tions from the optimal consumption path. In particular, our results suggest that actual
consumption decisions are on average overly sensitive to both current income and financial
wealth, whereas the slope of the income profile has no statistically significant effect on
2Several empirical studies find that in violation of the optimization assumption individual consumption
decisions are oversensitive to changes in current income (Wilcox, 1989) and to predictable changes in
income in the near future. (Shea, 1995; Parker, 1999; Souleles, 1999; Souleles, 2002).
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subject behaviour. We also find that the freedom to choose the income profile, on average,
reinforces this kind of rule-of-thumb behaviour, in the form of higher oversensitivity of
consumption decisions to current income and financial wealth. When people have more
flexibility, they do not seem to adopt sophisticated strategies that may prevent them from
making systematic errors. On the contrary, on average individuals tend to perform worse
when they have more flexibility. We argue that this finding may be due to the fact that
when people have the possibility to opt for a specific income profile, they pay less atten-
tion to the optimization task, believing that the choice of the income profile already brings
them close(r) to the optimal solution.
Several studies claim that after retirement average consumption drops suddenly in a
way that is inconsistent with rational optimizing behaviour (Bernheim et al., 2001; Schw-
erdt, 2005; Haider and Stephens, 2007 and Blau, 2008). Various explanations have been
proposed to account for this decline while maintaining the optimization assumption such
as, household bargaining (Lundberg et al., 2003), hyperbolic discounting (Angeletos et al.,
2001), household production (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2003 and Aguiar and Hurst, 2005) and
non-separable preferences over consumption and leisure (Laitner and Silverman, 2005). In-
terestingly, although none of these explanations is relevant and valid in our experimental
design, we do observe overconsumption prior to retirement, followed by an abrupt decline
in consumption at the time of retirement. In our experiment, this pattern is primarily
driven by the oversensitivity of consumption decisions to income coupled with the large
gap between income and optimal consumption prior to retirement. Our results suggest
that the oversensitivity explanation may potentially shed light on some of the puzzling
consumption trends that take place around retirement.
Our paper is closely related to the branch of the literature which investigates subject
behaviour in similar optimization tasks. Hey and Dardanoni (1988) conduct an experiment
to examine whether the subjects are able to smooth consumption in the face of income
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uncertainty. Anderhub et al. (2000) is more closely related to our study, as they adopt
an experimental setting with lifetime uncertainty and a deterministic income sequence.
Both studies find that subjects often make important mistakes when they deal with an
optimization problem. Johnson et al. (1988) gives the subjects different asset/labour
earnings mixes with equal present values, and finds that the propensity to consume out
of assets is higher than propensity to consume out of labour earnings. One of the few
experimental studies that do look at pensions is Fatas et al. (2013). They investigate the
effect of receiving lump-sum benefits as opposed to annuities and conclude that lump-sum
benefits lead to more cautious behaviour. One difference between our paper and the papers
by Johnson et al. (1988) and Fatas et al. (2013) is that our income profiles can be ranked
in terms of their closeness to the optimal consumption path. This allows us to examine the
causal relationship between the smoothness of the income profile and subject behaviour.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic life cycle
model upon which the experiment is based and introduces the experimental design and
procedures. Section 3 discusses basic descriptive statistics and the main results. Section 4
concludes.
2 The Experiment
This section sets out the basic life cycle model and discusses the experimental design.
2.1 The Model
In the experiment, subjects deal with a simple version of the life-cycle optimization prob-






subject to their flow budget constraint:
At+1 = At + Zt − Ct, A0 = 0, Ct ≥ 0, t = 1, . . . , 20, (2)
where Ct is private consumption, U(Ct) is instantaneous utility at period t, Pt is the
probability of an agent surviving to period t, At is the financial wealth at the beginning of
period t, and Zt is labour related income received at period t. Subjects live for a maximum
of 20 periods. Following Ballinger et al. (2003) we assume that the utility function is of
the generalized constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form:





where σ denotes the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption and k, θ,
and ε are adjustment parameters. This general specification of the CRRA function allows
us to set σ sufficiently high so that decision errors are costly. If σ > 1, k should attain
a positive value in order to ensure that U(Ct) > 0 for positive values of Ct. Whenever
k > 0, in order to attain U(0) = 0 it is necessary to set a positive ε. Although it is
possible to ensure that some of the typical properties of the utility function hold, it is not
guaranteed that the solution to the problem would be non-negative in the absence of the
Ct ≥ 0 condition.
Subjects receive a constant wage income while they are working, namely until period
12. An individual invests a constant fraction of his wage (τ , 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1) in his pension
account during his working life and in return he receives a benefit stream during retirement,
that is, from period 13 to 20. Net income in a given period can be expressed as follows:
Zt ≡
 W (1− τ) for 1 ≤ t ≤ 12Bt for 13 ≤ t ≤ 20 , (4)
where W is the gross wage and Bt is the benefit level in period t. Note that expression (4)
fully specifies an income profile, such that differences in income can only be explained by
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differences in income profiles. All relevant parameters in (3) are set in such a way that the
inequality constraints in (2) are non-binding.3 To accommodate a broad range of income
profiles, the benefit profile is assumed to be decreasing in time, such that:
Bt = Q−M(t− 13), M > 0, 13 ≤ t ≤ 20, (5)
This equation suggests that in the first retirement period (i.e., in period 13) subjects receive
a pension benefit Q and in each of the following periods the benefits decrease by M .4







It is assumed that a pension fund is able to offer a set of (τ,Q,M) combinations such that
for each combination (6) is satisfied. In particular, we consider four scenarios, which are
fully determined by the values of these parameters. Small values of τ and Q correspond
to a steep income profile with high net wage income and low retirement benefits whereas
higher values of τ and Q imply an income profile with a lower net wage income but higher
benefits after retirement. The scenario with τ = Bt = 0 corresponds to a situation without
pension provision. It is also assumed that the individual cannot choose to opt out of the
pension fund once she is in.
Equations (4)-(6) indicate that the return offered by the pension fund is equal to the
unconditional market return which is zero. Hence, in this simple model, the pension fund
aggregates the individual mortality risks and keeps the resulting profit. More specifically,
if at least one individual dies before reaching the maximum age, the pension fund runs
3This condition is deemed necessary, since it is conceivable that a problem with non-linear decision
rules is cognitively more demanding than one with linear decision rules. If the inequality constraints are
not binding in (2), equations (4)-(6) imply that the optimal consumption profiles are the same for any
income schedule offered by the pension fund.
4An obvious alternative is to assume a flat benefit profile. However, this assumption is quite restrictive
given the parameter values that we use in the experiment. Besides, many countries do not apply indexation
such that the pension benefits in real terms actually decrease over time.
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a surplus and otherwise it runs a balanced budget at the aggregate level.5 Equations
(4)-(6) ensure that the pension fund affects the steepness of the income profile, but not
lifetime income. Therefore, the pension fund has no economic effect other than its possible
behavioural effect on decision making. In the experiment, parameters are such that the
constraint 0 ≤ Ct ≤ At is not binding for any t. Given equations (2)–(6), optimal con-












− ε, 1 ≤ q ≤ 20. (7)
2.2 Experimental Design
In the experiment, subjects receive experimental tokens and are asked to make a series
of conversion decisions. The decision problem in the experiment is the analogue of the
optimization problem specified in Section 2.1, such that the amount of tokens that subjects
receive in each period corresponds to their net period income and the converted amounts
correspond to consumption decisions. With each conversion decision part of the token
stock is converted to real money, whereas the remaining part of the token stock is saved
and can be converted in a later period (see equation (2)).
The money subjects earn depends only on the amount of converted tokens. In other
words, any remaining, unconverted tokens have no monetary value. The monetary amounts
resulting from the conversion decisions are added up and paid to the subjects privately,
in cash, at the end of the experiment. Subjects proceed at their own pace and make
their decisions individually and sequentially throughout the experiment. It is not possible
5If the pension fund shares its surplus with the participants, the optimal pension size may no longer be
indeterminate but a positive amount. In that case the pension fund effectively issues annuities that provide
insurance against longevity risk, and some pension schedules may lead to higher welfare than others. Since
it is practically difficult to isolate the role of the pension fund in facilitating better decision making when
the optimal pension size is positive, it is assumed that the pension fund does not offer any insurance to
the participants.
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to change previous decisions at any point in time. At the beginning, subjects know the
number of tokens that they receive in each period. In other words, before making any
decisions, they are fully informed about the complete income profile.
Subjects can observe the relationship between converted tokens and period earnings in
a graph at all times (see instructions in Appendix C). This conversion function is based
on (3). We set σ = 1.20, ε = 20, and W = 2, 000, which leads to sizable monetary losses
for reasonable decision errors. We set θ = 0.40 so that expected average earnings are in
line with the usual amounts paid in the lab. Finally, in order to have, U(0) = 0, k is set
to 1.10. Hence, subjects deal with the following conversion function:
U(C) = 1.10− 2(C + 20)−0.2. (8)
During the experiment subjects can use a calculator, built in the screen, which computes
the monetary equivalent of a given number of tokens. In addition, each subject has a
simple hand calculator at his disposal during the experiment.
In the experiment, subjects may live for a maximum of 20 periods. Therefore, each
subject makes a maximum of 20 consecutive consumption decisions which cannot be mod-
ified once the decisions are confirmed. In line with equations (4) and (6), it is assumed
that subjects receive an exogenous income (gross wage, W ) in each period up to period 12.
A fixed fraction of this income (τW ) is saved as individual pension contributions, which is
to be paid back as benefits during retirement, namely after period 12.6 However, subjects
only observe their net income which is equivalent to income net of contributions (1− τ)W
from period 1 to 12 and benefits Q −M(t − 13) from period 13 to 20. In other words,
subjects do not observe the function of the pension fund.7
The only type of uncertainty that the subjects face is lifetime uncertainty. Starting
6Assuming that the individual is initially 20 years old and each period corresponds to 4 years, subjects
retire at the age of 68 and may live up to age 100.
7By informing subjects only about the resulting (net) income in each period and not framing contribu-
tions as deductions or losses, we try to minimize the potential effects of loss aversion on our results.
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from period 8, the experiment may be terminated depending on the result of a random
draw. At the end of period 8, the termination probability, that is the probability that the
experiment will not continue to the next period, is equal to 1/13. It is explained (and
demonstrated) that this probability is equal to the probability of drawing a red ball out
of a bag with 12 blue balls and one red ball.8 From period 8 until the last period, the
termination probabilities increase monotonically such that after period 9, the termination
probability is 1/12, after period 10 it is 1/11 and so on. Subjects are told that if they
survive to the next period one blue ball is removed from the bag before making a new
draw at the end of the next period. We believe that the resulting survival pattern is
a good approximation of the actual average mortality rates. Indeed, in the real world,
mortality rates are rather low until a certain age, after which they sharply increase.9 An
additional advantage of this design is that it enables subjects to understand and remember
the generated pattern easily.
Given these specifications the experimental lifetime can be naturally divided into three
intervals. During the first stage, that is from period 1 to 8, subjects receive a constant net
wage income and do not face any mortality risk. In the second stage, from period 9 to 12,
they keep receiving the same net wage income, yet the probability of death is positive and
increasing in each period. Finally in the third stage they do not receive wage income but
receive declining benefits and deal with an increasing death probability.
In general, in order to obtain a non-trivial solution to a life cycle optimization problem it
is necessary to impose a no-Ponzi game condition, which rules out infinite borrowing. In our
case, a stronger restriction is needed since we do not want subjects to leave the experiment
8Since subjects may be more sensitive to physical draws as opposed to the electronic ones, a demon-
stration was made at the beginning of each session using a bag and colored balls aimed at clarifying the
notion of a random draw.
9Under the same assumptions stated in footnote 6, the correlation between the survival rates in the
experiment and the actual average survival rates in the Netherlands is equal to 0.99 (p = 0.01). The actual
survival rates are obtained from the Human Mortality Database of University of California, Berkeley and
the Max Planck Institute for the years 2005–2009.
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Optimal consumption Scenario A
Scenario B Scenario C
Scenario D
with negative earnings. To prevent negative earnings we do not allow borrowing against
future income (tokens).10 Hence, in every period, subjects cannot convert more than the
sum of unconverted tokens from the previous period and the newly received tokens, i.e.
Ct ≤ At + Zt.
Although imposing borrowing constraints solves the problem at hand, it may lead to
other complexities, such as binding liquidity constraints. To avoid this, in all treatments
parameters are set in such a way that liquidity constraints are not binding at the optimum.
That is, along the optimal path the number of converted tokens (C∗t ) is strictly positive and
lower than the sum of accumulated tokens and newly received tokens. i.e. 0 < C∗t < At+Zt.
In the experiment we use four possible scenarios or income profiles, where each scenario
is defined by a stream of tokens in each period. These four possible token profiles are shown
in Figure 1 and the numerical values are given in Table A1 in Appendix A.11 Figure 1 also
10We could also have implemented another restriction in which total financial wealth should be bounded
away from a negative finite number before period 8, and from period 8 on, it should be bounded away
from 0. In order to avoid confusion on behalf of the subjects, borrowing against future tokens is disallowed
altogether.
11The corresponding τ ’s are 0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, respectively. To keep the structure similar across income
profiles the τ/M ratio is fixed. The corresponding M ’s are 0, 20, 40, and 60.
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shows the the optimal consumption path. Scenario A corresponds to the case without a
pension fund where, during their working lives (periods 1-12), subjects receive the highest
possible income and when retired (periods 13-20), they do not receive any income. The
motive for saving is the strongest in the case of scenario A and it weakens as the size of the
pension provision increases. Scenario D corresponds to the case with the largest pension
provision. In this scenario, the benefits are highest of all scenarios, yet in exchange the net
income in the first 12 periods is lower than the pre-retirement income in all of the other
scenarios. As can be seen from the figure, the optimal level of consumption is constant in
the first 8 periods, when the survival probability is 1 and then it falls gradually over time.
The figure illustrates that it is possible to rank the income profiles not only in terms of their
steepness, but also in terms of their closeness to the optimal consumption path. Namely,
as pension size increases, the income profile gets closer to the optimal consumption path.
We conducted two experimental treatments. In treatment 1, subjects receive one of
the income profiles in Figure 1, whereas in treatment 2 subjects have to choose the pro-
file that they would like to receive before they make their first conversion decision. As
mentioned, given the parameters if subjects behave optimally throughout the experiment,
consumption will be constant during the first 8 periods, it will start declining as of period
9 when mortality risk kicks in and it should continue declining during retirement. We
investigate whether the decisions are consistent with these predictions. More importantly,
standard economic theory predicts that subjects’ behaviour does not depend on treatment
or scenario, i.e. our null hypothesis is that the consumption decisions are the same across
all scenarios and treatments. As indicated in the introduction, behavioural economics
and experimental evidence suggest that people may not always behave rationally but may
make systematic errors. Therefore, the first alternative hypothesis is that the presence
of a pension provision, or equivalently, the steepness of the income profile does have an
effect on subject behaviour. To test this hypothesis, we compare subject behaviour given
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different income profiles in treatment 1. The second alternative hypothesis is that subjects
may behave differently when they have the ability to choose the size of the pension fund,
or in other words, the slope of the income profile. We test this hypothesis by comparing
decisions in treatments 1 and 2. Even if behavioural biases play a role, it is not so clear
whether and how people may be affected by income profiles and treatments. Whether
subjects make better decisions in one scenario or treatment than in another remains an
empirical question and we do not want to speculate about the hypothesized direction of
possible differences.
2.3 Experimental Procedure
Invitations were sent to Tilburg University students who have previously indicated that
they would like to participate in economic experiments that take place on campus. 127
participants responded positively to the invitation and took part in one of the two treat-
ments (65 in treatment 1 and 62 in treatment 2). Subjects participated in only one of
the 10 experimental sessions and in each session only one treatment was run. All sessions
were run in CentERlab at Tilburg University. Following their arrival at the lab, subjects
were randomly seated behind computer terminals, instructions were distributed and read
aloud by the experimenter. In order to familiarize subjects with the experiment, they were
presented a quiz form before the experiment. The questions on the form are based on
the design of the actual experiment and are specifically aimed at improving the subject’s
understanding of conditional probabilities. In treatment 1, subjects were confronted with
one of the four possible scenarios; all subjects in a session faced the same scenario. In
treatment 2, subjects were confronted with all four scenarios and had to select one. Each
session lasted on average about an hour, but since survival probabilities were individually
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and randomly drawn some subjects finished much earlier than others.12 In the experiment,
subjects converted their tokens to money which they received at the end of the session.
Earnings range from e2.16 to e12.32 with an average of e10.16 and a standard deviation
of e2.53.
3 Results
This section discusses descriptive statistics and analyzes the results. Subsection 3.1 includes
an aggregate level analysis whereas individual behaviour is examined in more detail in
subsection 3.2.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
This section reports and discusses aggregate statistics concerning scenario selection, con-
sumption decisions and earnings. Absent any decision errors all scenarios would lead to
the same expected payoff. Even if subjects make decision errors, expected payoff will be
the same across scenarios as long as the decisions errors are random. Different scenarios
would only lead to different expected payoffs if subjects make systematic decision errors
rather than random ones. Therefore, a rational payoff-maximizing subject is expected to
be indifferent between scenarios in treatment 2. She may have a strict preference for a
particular income profile, only if she makes systemic decision errors and is sophisticated
enough to realize that some scenarios lead to higher payoffs than others given these errors.
An example of such a systematic error is a bias to consume the entire period income in each
period. A subject who converts tokens according to this rule will in expectation earn the
highest possible amount if she chooses scenario D. She would indeed choose this scenario
if she knows that she will consume her period income in each period. Apart from that,
12We believe that subjects understood the survival rates and believed that they were truly randomly
determined. We have not received any questions on this aspect of the experiment.
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Table 1: Average Consumption and Average Earnings (Euros)
Consumption
Treatment Scenario A B C D All
1 Mean 1456.63 1433.78 1536.57 1349.98 1437.87
Std dev. 926.48 767.94 875.37 551.28 825.11
Number of obs. 462 167 99 202 930
2 Mean 1427.93 1543.25 1417.74 1447.34 1459.70
Std dev. 830.14 859.92 1092.02 545.56 814.40
Number of obs. 318 205 104 215 842
Both Mean 1444.93 1494.11 1475.69 1443.10 1448.24
Std dev. 888.03 820.64 991.64 549.84 819.88
Number of obs. 780 372 203 417 1772
Earnings
Treatment Scenario A B C D All
1 Mean 8.54 8.32 7.39 9.50 8.55
Std dev. 2.00 1.79 2.05 2.41 2.10
Number of obs. 32 12 8 13 65
2 Mean 8.35 7.26 8.79 8.36 8.10
Std dev. 1.86 2.34 2.20 2.24 2.15
Number of obs. 22 17 7 16 62
Both Mean 8.46 7.70 8.04 8.87 8.33
Std dev. 1.93 2.16 2.16 2.35 2.13
Number of obs. 54 29 15 29 127
people may have preferences that are not in line with standard economic assumptions. For
instance, if people value flexibility, they may choose scenario A in treatment 2, as it offers
the highest incomes before retirement and is most flexible.
Table A.2 in Appendix A shows the number of subjects across treatments and scenarios.
First, we ran several sessions of treatment 2, in which subjects could choose their preferred
scenario. Scenario A was by far the most popular choice, followed by scenarios B and
D, which were almost equally likely to be chosen. Although all income profiles have a
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positive and reasonable chance of being chosen, not all scenarios are equally popular; the
hypothesis that scenarios are selected randomly by the subjects can be rejected at the
1 percent level (p = 0.01).13 In treatment 1, the numbers of subjects per scenario are
exogenously determined. Here we allocated subjects to scenarios such that the numbers
correspond reasonably well to the endogenous allocation in treatment 2.
Table 1 presents the average consumption (top panel) and average earnings (bottom
panel) in each scenario for both treatments. The average consumption is the average
number of tokens that is converted in each period in the given scenario/treatment. At a
first glance, differences between treatments and differences between scenarios are relatively
small. For example, average earnings in treatment 1 are e0.45 higher than in treatment 2.
Note, however, that it is hard to draw any conclusions based on these averages because they
depend on the realized lifetimes. A subject who has a lifetime of 8 periods is likely to have
relatively high average consumption and relatively low earnings. Since lifetimes were truly
randomly determined and the number of subjects in some scenarios is low, the realized
lifetimes may not be evenly distributed across scenarios and treatments. In addition, these
averages do not show the development of decisions across periods. To that end, the next
section will present a more elaborate analysis.
3.2 Analysis of the Results
The analysis begins with the comparison of actual consumption decisions with the optimal
consumption profile. The latter variable can be defined in two different ways and both
definitions are considered below. According to the first definition it is simply the ex-
ante optimal lifetime consumption profile at the beginning of the experiment. The second
definition involves re-calculation of the optimal consumption path in each period based on
13Selection of scenarios is characterized by a multinomial distribution where the probability of a subject
selecting into each scenario is equal to 0.25.
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(7). The two versions of the optimal consumption profile are referred to as ex-ante optimal
consumption profile and ex-post optimal consumption profile, respectively. They differ only
if subjects deviate from the ex-ante optimal path. For instance, if a subject consumes 500
less than the optimal amount in period 2, this would not affect the optimal consumption in
period 3 according to the ex-ante measure whereas according to the ex-post definition the
optimal consumption in period 3 and in all later periods would be higher than what they
would be if the period 2 consumption were optimal. Note that in any given period ex-ante
optimal consumption is the same for all subjects whereas ex-post optimal consumption can
be different for each subject.
3.2.1 Graphical Analysis
Figure 2 shows the income profile, the ex-ante optimal consumption path and the average
consumption for both treatments. Each panel refers to one specific scenario. Although the
relationship between income profile and average consumption levels is not immediately clear
from the graphs, they allow for some general observations. First, while actual consumption
is roughly in between the income and the ex-ante optimal consumption, it typically follows
the (exogenously given) income pattern quite closely. Second, there seem to be quite
substantial differences across panels, suggesting that although the optimal consumption
path does not depend on the scenario, actual consumption decisions are affected by the
income profiles. Third, within the panels, the difference between average consumption in
treatments 1 and 2 seems to be rather small. The last general observation is that regardless
of the scenario and treatment, subjects convert on average rather low amounts in the very
first period and then increase their consumption in the next period. It should be noted
that the closeness of average consumption decisions to optimal consumption decisions does
not necessarily reveal average subject performance, since one subject’s overconsumption
may be offset by another subject’s under-consumption. Nevertheless, the figure depicts
17
Figure 2: Actual and Ex-ante Optimal Consumption per Income Profile




















































Note: The dotted and dashed lines represent the ex-ante optimal consumption profile and the
income profile respectively.
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Figure 3: Actual Consumption Minus Optimal Consumption





























average overconsumption and under-consumption trends throughout the life-cycle. Note,
however, that these findings are based on the ex-ante definition of optimal consumption.
Alternatively, by considering the ex-post measure, one can account for the changes in
the optimal profile as the subject progresses in the experiment. For this purpose Figure 3
depicts the evolution of the gap between the ex-post optimal consumption and actual
consumption in a given period, averaged across the subjects. Because the number of
observations in each scenario is limited, in the analyses that follow, observations that fall
under scenarios A and B are pooled together and together they are referred to as the low-
pensions category. Similarly, scenarios C and D constitute the high-pensions category. The
left panel displays the gap measure at the treatment level aggregated over all scenarios.
The middle (right) panel presents the gap for the low and high pension scenarios separately
for treatment 1 (2). According to the left panel of the figure, on average the evolution of the
gap is quite similar in both treatments: the difference being negative in the first periods,
positive in the middle periods and close to zero in the last periods. Furthermore, the figure
shows that subject averages move together for high and low-pension profiles especially
in treatment 1. In treatment 2, subjects who choose low-pensions on average consume
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Table 2: Consumption patterns
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Low pensions High Pensions Low pensions High Pensions
(a) Average decline in optimal 9.50% 9.50% 9.50% 9.50%
consumption at retirement
Average decline in actual 37.25% 21.42% 60.67% 36.21%
consumption at retirement
Number of observations 28 12 22 14
(b) Share of subjects whose 64.29% 66.67% 31.82% 35.71%
consumption drop
after period 12
(c) Share of subjects that consume 79.55% 65.00% 69.23% 65.22%
a constant amount during
the first 8 periods
Share of subjects whose 22.73% 11.77% 9.68% 4.34%
consumption drop
after period 8
(d) Average decline in actual 26.61% 0.44% 3.40% 19.35%
consumption after period 8
Average change in optimal -6.53% -6.53% -6.53% -6.53%
consumption after period 8
Number of observations 43 18 31 22
consistently more than subjects who choose high pensions.
Taken together, Figures 2 and 3 suggest that there is a substantial change in con-
sumption levels around retirement age. In addition, in the second stage (periods 9-12)
overconsumption is evident, and more so in treatment 2 and for the low pension scenarios.
Finally, in the third stage (periods 13-20), the subjects tend to under-consume on average,
although this trend is not as pronounced.
3.2.2 Numerical Analysis
The observed drop in consumption at the time of retirement is of particular interest.
Several empirical studies have found a strong decrease in consumption immediately after
retirement, which is not in line with the predictions of standard life-cycle models. Possible
20
explanations for this consumption pattern include household production, hyperbolic dis-
counting, within household bargaining, and non-separable preferences over consumption
and leisure (see Laitner and Silverman, 2005). Even though all these alternative explana-
tions can be ruled out in our case we nevertheless observe a sizable drop in consumption.
The optimal decline in consumption from period 12 to period 13 is 9.50% and it does not
depend on the scenario or treatment (see first row of Table 2). As can be seen from the
second row of the table, the average actual decays range from about 21% to 60%. The
actual declines are much larger than the optimal one and the differences between the drops
in actual and optimal consumption are statistically significant in all cases except for the
high pensions scenario in treatment 1 (p = 0.15, all other p <0.05, Wilcoxon signed ranks
tests). Furthermore, the average decline is significantly larger when subjects choose the
income profile (treatment 1 versus 2 gives p = 0.014 for low pensions and p = 0.067 for
high pensions) and also larger for low pensions than for high pensions, but only signifi-
cantly so in treatment 2 (p = 0.034 in treatment 2 and p = 0.337 in treatment 1)14. In
Table 2, row labeled (b) shows the share of subjects that reduce their consumption when
retired, so after period 12. Remarkably, the percentages in treatment 1 are about twice as
high as in treatment 2. However, this difference between the treatments is not statistically
significant (p=0.25). Hence, even in such a stylized environment as ours we observe an
abrupt decline in consumption after retirement for a considerable number of people. Per-
haps more importantly, the magnitude of the drop and the fraction of people experiencing
this depend on the income profile and even more strongly on whether or not the scenario is
exogenously determined. We think that this is a novel and interesting observation, which
would be hard to detect outside the controlled environment of an experiment and which
could have important consequences for real-world situations.
The bottom half of Table 2 gives some insights about subjects behaviour before retire-
14Note that the number of observations is lower than the number of subjects in each treatment/scenario
as not all subjects reach the retirement age.
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ment. As indicated in the first row of the part labeled (c), a majority of subjects consume
a constant amount during the first 8 periods, which is in line with standard economic
theory. In contrast to the standard predictions, however, very few subjects turn out to
react to the uncertainty in lifetime introduced after period 8 by reducing their consump-
tion. Again, the share of people responding in the right direction is higher in treatment 1
compared to treatment 2, although the difference is not statistically significant (p=0.31).
A similar difference can be seen when comparing the low and high pension scenarios, and
this difference is independent of the treatment. Finally, the last three rows of the table,
labeled (d), show that the average change in actual consumption after period 8 is positive
in all scenario and treatments, although the theory predicts a decline of 6.53%. The actual
change in consumption exceeds the optimal change significantly in the case of Treatment
1 - High pensions (p=0.018), Treatment 2 - Low pensions (p=0.093), Treatment 2 - Low
pensions (p=0.0663) but not in the case of Treatment 1 - Low pensions (p=0.158). The
next sections try to shed some more light on these observations.
Although Table 1 suggests that average consumption and average earnings are similar
both across treatments and pension profiles, differences in individual behaviour could still
exist. Indeed, the results of the previous subsection indicate that there may be reasons
to suspect that subjects behave differently in different settings. Therefore, we look more
closely into individual behaviour. In particular, we investigate if subjects employ simple
suboptimal decision rules and if the prevalence of these decision rules differ across settings.
Given the relative complexity of the task it is not reasonable to expect subjects to
be able to follow the optimal decision rule precisely. Instead, as also suggested by previ-
ous experimental findings, subjects may rely on simple, suboptimal decision rules. There
are virtually an unlimited number of decision rules that subjects could use when making
consumption decisions. In the following analysis, three natural candidates are considered:
(1) consuming a constant amount; (2) consuming a constant fraction of income; and (3)
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consuming a constant fraction of financial wealth in each period. In addition to these
strategies, a subject may employ any combination of these pure strategies. For example,
one subject’s responses may be best explained by a linear combination of (1) and (3),
whereas another subject may only follow decision rule (2). It is also possible that subjects
follow the optimal consumption profile closely and do not employ any of the three decision
rules systematically. We test empirically whether linear combinations of these rules are
employed. If optimal consumption is not controlled for its effect on the actual consumption
decision will be picked up by other variables since optimal consumption is a function of
current income and financial wealth. For this reason, based on equation (7) an ex-post
optimal consumption variable is created and added to the set of explanatory variables.
As a precursor to a more detailed analysis, the explanatory power of these decision rules
is tested on an aggregate level without any individual-specific effects. In these estimations,
actual consumption is explained by optimal consumption, current income, current financial
wealth and a constant, which are possible determinants of actual consumption decisions.
If the subjects decided optimally or made random decision errors, the coefficient of the
optimal consumption variable would be the only statistically significant determinant of
actual consumption decisions and it would be equal to or very close to 1. If any of the
explanatory variables other than optimal consumption turn out to be significant, this
indicates that on average subjects employ sub-optimal decision rules systematically and
therefore exhibit behavioural biases.
Table 3 presents the regression results for all secenarios together. Columns 2 and 3 (5
and 6) show the results for both treatments separately when a constant term is included
(not included). To explore differences between the two treatments columns 4 and 7 show the
estimates when both treatments are taken together and interaction terms are included for
treatment 2, with and without a constant term respectively. Despite substantial variation
in subject performance, actual consumption loosely tracks optimal consumption in both
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Table 3: OLS Regressions
With constant term Without constant term
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Both Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Both
Optimal consumption 0.255*** 0.036 0.255*** 0.424*** 0.147** 0.424***
(0.078) (0.077) (0.076) (0.070) (0.073) (0.068)
Income 0.442*** 0.667*** 0.442*** 0.471*** 0.724*** 0.471***
(0.053) (0.058) (0.052) (0.053) (0.057) (0.052)
Financial wealth 0.036** 0.058*** 0.036*** 0.034** 0.058*** 0.034**
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
Treatment 2 dummy -40.727
(96.027)
Treatment 2 dummy x -0.219** -0.277***
Optimal consumption (0.110) (0.102)
Treatment 2 dummy x 0.225*** 0.253***
Income (0.079) (0.078)
Treatment 2 dummy x 0.022 0.024
Financial wealth (0.022) (0.022)
Constant 318.026*** 277.299*** 318.026***
(69.296) (66.218) (67.436)
N 930 842 1772 930 842 1772
R-squared 0.26 0.33 0.30 0.81 0.84 0.83
Note: The dependent variable is the actual consumption decision. Standard errors are presented
in parenthesis. ***,** and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels.
treatments. In the regressions where the constant term is excluded, the coefficient of the
optimal consumption variable is substantially lower than 1, which indicates that decisions
are on average far from optimal. In theory, the marginal propensity to consume out
of current income should be the same as marginal propensity to consume out of financial
assets excluding current income. However, both variables should be irrelevant once optimal
consumption is accounted for. In all specifications the coefficients of current income and
financial wealth are statistically significant. The magnitude of the coefficients indicates
that in both treatments subjects are rather sensitive to current income and to a smaller
extent to financial wealth. This means that when income is higher (lower) subjects tend
to consume more (less), even when other factors are controlled for.
As optimal consumption starts declining after period 8, the wedge between income and
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optimal consumption steadily increases until period 12. Given this pattern, oversensitivity
of consumption to current income leads to considerable overconsumption before retirement,
which corroborates the picture arising from Figures 2 and 3. After retirement, income
declines substantially which may cause consumption to get closer to optimal consumption
and even fall below it, as we also observed in the graphs.
The estimation results in columns 4 and 7 can be used to test whether the coefficients
are significantly different across treatments. Column 4 shows that in treatment 2, the con-
sumption decisions are significantly less sensitive to optimal consumption and significantly
more sensitive to current income than in treatment 1. When the constant term is excluded
the results remain qualitatively similar, as exhibited in column 7. Therefore, our findings
suggest that when people can chose their pension provision (in treatment 2), they base
their consumption decisions on current income more than people who are assigned to a
specific pension provision (as in treatment 1). It is possible that this pattern arises because
subjects in treatment 2 are consuming exactly their income more frequently than subjects
in treatment 1. In the experiment, subjects are found to frequently choose a consumption
level that is equal to their current income. The frequency of such observations is higher
in treatment 2 (25.77%) than in treatment 1 (17.87%), and the difference is significant
according to a χ-squared test (p = 0.01). Therefore, the higher coefficient of the current
income variable in treatment 2 is at least partly driven by observations where consumption
is equal to current income.
3.2.3 Individual Effects
The analysis based on ordinary least squares regressions (OLS) regressions gives a general
idea about average decision patterns across treatments and pension profiles. However,
some of the assumptions behind these specifications may be considered to be restrictive
and could be replaced by more realistic ones. For example, although it is plausible that
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each subject follows a different decision rule and therefore explanatory variables may have
different weights for each subject, the OLS regressions do not allow for individual specific
effects. To capture this type of unobserved heterogeneity, we incorporate individual effects
to both the constant term and the other coefficients. One way to introduce individual
effects is to use fixed effects, which is equivalent to the pooled OLS analysis with individual
dummies and interaction terms that involve individual dummies and other regressors. Since
the number of variables to be estimated becomes very large, it is often assumed that each
individual effect is drawn from a population with a certain statistical distribution and then
the unknown parameters of this distribution are estimated. This specification is known
as the random effects or random coefficients specification (Greene, 2003). The empirical
model is defined as follows:
Cit = (β
0 + α0i ) + (β
1 + α1i )C
∗
it + (β
2 + α2i )Zit + (β
3 + α3i )Ait + εit, (9)
where αki ’s are the individual effects, β
ks are the coefficients and εit is the error term. With
treatment effects this linear model can be expressed as:
Cit = (β
0 + α0i ) + (β
1 + α1i )C
∗
it + (β
2 + α2i )Zit + (β
3 + α3i )Ait + (β
4 + α4i )Di +(10)
(β5 + α5i )DiC
∗
it + (β
6 + α6i )DiZit + (β
7 + α7i )DiAit + εit,
where Di is a treatment dummy, which is equal to 1 if subject i is in treatment 2.
In both random coefficients specifications, it is assumed that each one of the αki terms
is drawn from different normal distributions with zero mean and unknown variance such
that:15
αki v N(0, σ
k2) for ∀ k (11)
15The random effects specification is also referred to as mixed effects specification as the random in-
dividual effects are broken into two parts, namely the fixed part, βk terms, and the random, individual
specific part, αki terms.
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The residual term is also drawn from a normal distribution:
εit v N(0, η
2)
Finally, we have to make assumptions about the covariances between different random
coefficients. We will consider two possibilities. According to the first specification, which
corresponds to columns 2-4 in Table 4, it is assumed that different types of individual fixed
effects have zero covariance:
Cov(αki , α
l
i) = 0 for k 6= l (12)
Note that this assumption may be restrictive, since in practice subjects may substitute
one decision strategy with another decision strategy, which means that individual fixed
effects that correspond to different variables do not have zero covariance. According to
the second specification, the results of which are shown in columns 5-7 in Table 4, the
covariance structure between the individual effects is more flexible, such that:
Var
[








where M and N are 4 × 4 matrices. According to this assumption individual random
effects can be correlated with each other in a given treatment, whereas they are uncorrelated
across treatments. If these assumptions are correct, random effects estimates obtained by
maximum likelihood estimation will be consistent and efficient (Greene, 2003).
The regression results are presented in Table 4, which is organized in a similar way as
Table 3. The random coefficients specifications lead to similar results as the pooled OLS
results. As in the case of OLS regressions, according to the null hypothesis of no systemic
decision errors, only the coefficient of optimal consumption should be statistically signifi-
cant and close to 1. In all specifications, however, the coefficient of optimal consumption is
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Table 4: Random Coefficients Regressions
Without covariance With covariance
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Both Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Both
Optimal consumption 0.330*** 0.023 0.330*** 0.248*** -0.019 0.264***
(0.082) (0.084) (0.079) (0.099) (0.092) (0.092)
Income 0.370*** 0.664*** 0.365*** 0.434*** 0.669*** 0.419***
(0.060) (0.065) (0.057) (0.074) (0.071) (0.068)
Financial wealth 0.139*** 0.208*** 0.145*** 0.143*** 0.215*** 0.148***
(0.024) (0.031) (0.024) (0.029) (0.035) (0.028)
Treatment 2 dummy -72.439 -20.082
(105.571) (111.690)
Treatment 2 dummy x -0.333*** -0.287**
Optimal consumption (0.123) (0.147)
Treatment 2 dummy x 0.310*** 0.257**
Income (0.092) (0.111)
Treatment 2 dummy x 0.098** 0.083*
Financial wealth (0.045) (0.049)
Constant 178.721** 137.018** 182.193*** 164.740** 188.284*** 172.167**
(71.161) (66.369) (69.377) (72.747) (67.563) (71.741)
N 930 842 1772 930 842 1772
BIC 14817.516 13313.700 28169.169 14780.018 13297.762 28113.025
Note: The dependent variable is the actual consumption decision. Standard errors are presented
in parenthesis. ***,** and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels.
considerably and significantly below one and in treatment 2 it is not significantly different
from zero. As before, the coefficients of income and financial wealth variables are posi-
tive and statistically significant.16 Also, as in the pooled OLS case, the coefficients differ
considerably across treatments but most patterns are qualitatively similar to the previous
ones. Given either covariance structure, subjects in treatment 2 tend to base their de-
cisions significantly more on current income and financial wealth while at the same time
they put significantly less weight on the optimal consumption profile compared to subjects
in treatment 1.
16When the constant term is excluded the results are quite similar. These regression results are not
reported for the sake of brevity, but are available upon request.
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In all specifications the estimated coefficient of the income variable is considerably
higher than that of the financial wealth variable whereas sample averages of these vari-
ables are close, 1,566.98 and 1,625.57, respectively. It can be concluded that, on average,
oversensitivity to current income may lead to a much larger deviation from the optimal
solution than oversensitivity to financial wealth. The coefficient of the constant term does
not differ significantly across treatments, although it is arguably similar to the other two
strategies in terms of both simplicity and effectiveness.17
Figure 4 shows the average predictions of the model for each treatment. The figure
suggests that our model captures some of the pronounced features in the data. According to
the figure, the average predicted consumption is higher than optimal consumption between
periods 10 and 12 and lower than optimal consumption after period 12. This pattern is
roughly in line with the pattern of actual consumption shown in the left panel of Figure 3.
The model also predicts higher consumption in treatment 1 than in treatment 2 between
periods 10 and 12 which is also observed in the left panel of Figure 3. Nevertheless,
this predicted difference between treatment 1 and treatment 2 is smaller than the actual
difference. Therefore, there could be other factors affecting consumption decisions which
are not accounted for in our model.
Our results imply that the decision rules that the subjects seem to employ to make their
consumption decisions depend on the freedom to choose the pension fund. The signs and
statistical significance of the interaction terms in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that, in treatment
2, where subjects have freedom to pick their income streams, their consumption decisions
are on average more likely to be based on simpler, sub-optimal decision rules and less
likely to follow the optimal consumption path. Standard economic theory would suggest
that, if anything, the decision problem in treatment 2 is easier because subjects have more
17In Table A.4 in the Appendix, we do not control for optimal consumption. According to our results,
in the ”without covariance” specification consumption decisions are more sensitive to current income in
treatment 2. In the ”without covariance” specification, we do not find a statistically significant difference
between the two treatments.
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Figure 4: Predicted values (columns 1 and 2 in Table 4)
information, i.e. about four possible income profiles, than in treatment 1. Nevertheless,
subjects’ behaviour in treatment 2 seems to be worse than in treatment 1.18
Although it is difficult to identify the exact reasons for these findings we would like to
speculate about some possible explanations. The way the problem is presented in both
treatments is not the same. In treatment 2, subjects may be possibly led to think that
one of the scenarios provides the best answer to the given problem. As a result, they
may believe that once the right stream is chosen, consumption decisions should follow the
income stream very closely. This reasoning could explain why the coefficient of current
income is higher in treatment 2, but it fails to explain the larger coefficient of the current
financial wealth variable in treatment 2. The findings in this section also suggest that
basing decisions on current income or financial wealth may be regarded as a substitute for
basing decisions on the optimal consumption profile, since, when the explanatory power of
optimal consumption is lower (higher), the explanatory power of both current income and
18A more direct measure of subject performance may be the realized efficiency in each scenario. For each
subject, the realized efficiency of all consumption decisions is computed by dividing the realized payoffs by
the maximum possible payoffs given the realized lifetime. For each scenario, the average efficiency can be
calculated by taking the average of all subjects in that particular scenario and treatment. As it is shown
in Table A.3 in Appendix A, the realized levels of efficiency are rather high in all scenarios and treatments.
This suggests that the decision errors made by the subjects do not translate into significant monetary
losses. In both treatments the efficiency is highest in the scenario with the flattest income profile, scenario
D.
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financial wealth is higher (lower). In a similar vein, following the optimal consumption
profile could be considered to be more challenging than employing simpler, suboptimal
decision rules. Since subjects tend to follow simple suboptimal decision rules especially in
treatment 2, it may be argued that subjects pay relatively less attention after they have
chosen the income stream. This argument would be in line with the two system approach
of Kahneman (2011). Kahneman argues that there are two types of reasoning which affect
behaviour. System 1 type reasoning is a thought process which is fast, automatic and
habitual, wheras system 2 type reasoning corresponds to a slower and conscious type of
thinking. In treatment 1 subjects are exposed to one, complex, problem which may trigger
deep, system 2 type, reasoning. In contrast, in treatment 2, subjects first have to choose
the scenario which may also be considered a cognitively demanding, non-trivial decision.
This choice may also evoke system 2 type thinking. After subjects have chosen the scenario
they may rely on relatively simple, intuitive and effortless rules such as rule-of-thumb rules
that are considered above. This type of thinking corresponds to the system 1 thinking in
Kahneman’s terminology.
We also examine the differences across income profiles (see Table 5). Although subjects
behave differently across treatments, differences in behaviour across scenarios are statis-
tically insignificant. Within each treatment, consumption decisions are equally sensitive
to optimal consumption, income and financial wealth in the case of low and high pension
profile, as it is depicted in Table 5. This pattern is observed both when income stream is















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Heterogeneity in risk aversion may potentially explain several patterns, including the vari-
ance in subject performance in general and the choice of the pension profile in treatment
2. We test whether risk aversion affects these choices in a significant way. After the ex-
periment, a standard Holt and Laury (2002) type of risk aversion test is conducted where
subjects make 10 binary choices between simple lotteries and receive a payment based on
one of the choices that they make (see Part 2 of the Instructions in Appendix C). It is
possible that risk averse subjects view mortality as a risk and consume more than other
subjects before the mortality risk becomes relevant. If this is the case, we would observe
that in early periods, the average consumption of risk averse subjects would be higher than
ex-ante optimal consumption (dashed line in Figure 1), whereas it would be lower than
ex-ante optimal consumption in later periods. According to the results displayed in Ta-
ble A.6, in treatment 1 relatively risk averse subjects do not consume more than relatively
risk-loving subjects in earlier periods.
It is also possible that some scenarios are regarded safer than others and these scenarios
are more likely to be chosen by risk averse subjects. In particular, risk averse subjects may
be expected to choose one of the scenarios with high income and low pensions. However,
as indicated in Table A.5 in Appendix A, subjects whose risk aversion score is relatively
low are not more or less likely to choose one of the scenarios that belong to the low-pension
category. Therefore, risk aversion does not affect scenario selection, and also not strongly
consumption decisions.
4 Conclusions
We examine the data from a laboratory experiment, where subjects deal with a simple
version the life-cycle consumption optimization problem, and find that on average con-
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sumption decisions are more sensitive to current income and financial wealth and less
sensitive to optimal consumption when subjects choose the pension size themselves before
the optimization task. According to our findings the slope of the income profile by itself
does not have a significant effect on consumption decisions. In all settings the decline in
consumption at retirement is far greater than the optimal decline. The magnitude of this
sub-optimal drop is significantly higher when the subjects choose their income path. The
results suggest that subjects exert less cognitive effort when they are given more freedom.
In our experiment, the shift from optimal behaviour to rule of thumb behaviour does
not translate into a significant decline in earnings. However, in reality such a change may
have important welfare and policy consequences. Given the observed patterns, it can be
concluded that shifting the responsibilities from pension funds to pensioners may not always
produce desirable outcomes. Policy makers and pension designers may potentially influence
the welfare of pensioners by restricting the number of alternative pension arrangements
that are offered.
For economists, it is often difficult to observe how much their optimizing models can
explain the decisions of individuals who face fairly complex problems. Previous studies
suggest that consumption decisions are possibly affected by the cognitive cost of optimiza-
tion and framing of the optimization problem. Although pension funds to a large extent
determine the allocation of income across life it is difficult to isolate the affect of pension
parameters on subject behaviour. We believe that controlled experiments are suited for
this purpose and they may play an important role in future analysis.
In this paper, we present the subjects a typical problem which has the same structure
as a life-cycle optimization problem. We choose this particular type of problem because
it is often used by the economists to describe household behaviour. Future research could
clarify whether our conclusions remain valid in other contexts.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Income Profiles Used in the Experiment
Period Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D
1 2000 1900 1800 1700
2 2000 1900 1800 1700
3 2000 1900 1800 1700
4 2000 1900 1800 1700
5 2000 1900 1800 1700
6 2000 1900 1800 1700
7 2000 1900 1800 1700
8 2000 1900 1800 1700
9 2000 1900 1800 1700
10 2000 1900 1800 1700
11 2000 1900 1800 1700
12 2000 1900 1800 1700
13 0 297 594 891
14 0 255 510 765
15 0 213 426 639
16 0 171 342 513
17 0 129 258 387
18 0 87 174 261
19 0 45 90 135
20 0 3 6 9
24000 24000 24000 24000
Note: The amounts listed under scenarios are denominated in tokens. The sum of tokens in each
profile is given in the last row. The scenarios are ordered by the size of the pension fund such that
as one moves to the right in the table pension size increases and income profiles get flatter. Scenario
A corresponds to the case without a pension fund where, during their working lives (periods 1-12),
subjects receive the highest possible income and when retired (periods 13-20), they do not receive
any income. The motive for saving is the strongest in the case of scenario A and it weakens as
the size of the pension fund increases. Scenario D corresponds to the case with the largest pension
fund. In this scenario, the benefits are highest of all scenarios, yet in exchange the net income in
the first 12 periods is lower than the pre-retirement income in all of the other scenarios.
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Table A.2: Observations
Scenario Low pension High pension
Treatment A B C D Total
1 32 12 8 13 65
2 22 17 7 16 62
Table A.3: Efficiency
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D
Treatment 1 .989 .966 .938 .995
.052 .146 .093 .030
Treatment 2 .980 .964 .979 .988
.108 .074 .070 .035
Note: Standard deviations are reported in the bottom row.
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Table A.4: Random Coefficients Regressions
Without covariance With covariance
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Both Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Both
Income 0.375*** 0.662*** 0.445*** 0.416*** 0.671*** 0.476***
(0.060) (0.066) (0.050) (0.063) (0.068) (0.053)
Financial wealth 0.129*** 0.197*** 0.143*** 0.124*** 0.196*** 0.139***
(0.022) (0.030) (0.022) (0.024) (0.031) (0.023)
Treatment 2 -178.594* -148.325
(97.721) (109.438)
Treatment 2 x Income 0.111* 0.099
(0.060) (0.067)
Treatment 2 x Financial wealth 0.059 0.049
(0.040) (0.040)
Constant 178.919** 130.139* 235.132*** 247.476*** 195.320*** 296.506***
(71.022) (66.751) (66.771) (79.982) (69.580) (73.387)
N 930 842 1772 930 842 1772
BIC 14814.297 13312.479 28152.220 14802.102 13307.619 28135.779
Note: The dependent variable is the actual consumption decision. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis.
***,** and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels.
Figure 5: Predicted values (columns 1 and 2 in Table A.4)
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Note: The dependent variable is the high-pension dummy. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***,** and
* denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels.
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Risk aversion x Optimal consumption -0.586
(0.853)
Risk aversion x Income 0.053
(1.209)




Interval 2 x Optimal consumption 0.771
(0.606)
Interval 2 x Income -0.776
(0.878)
Interval 2 x Financial wealth -0.115
(0.072)
Interval 2 x Risk aversion 348.651
(6978.891)
Interval 2 x Risk aversion x Optimal consumption 1.178
(0.961)
Interval 2 x Risk aversion x Income -1.462
(3.574)




Interval 3 x Optimal consumption 1.357*
(0.716)
Interval 3 x Income 0.321
(0.671)
Interval 3 x Financial wealth -0.164
(0.109)
Interval 3 x Risk aversion -915.889
(2851.852)
Interval 3 x Risk aversion x Optimal consumption -0.273
(1.520)
Interval 3 x Risk aversion x Income 0.063
(1.939)





Note: The dependent variable is the actual consumption decision. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis. ***,** and
* denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Observations are drawn from treatment 1. The structure
of the empirical model is the same as the random coefficients specification with covariance which is outlined above. That
is, individual effects that correspond to the constant term, income, current income and financial wealth are allowed to have
covariance, yet covariance is not allowed for across different groups of subjects. Risk aversion dummy takes the value 1 when


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































subject to At+1 = At + Zt − Ct, t = q, . . . , 20, (15)
where Aq is given. At+1 ≥ Ct ≥ 0 constraint is dropped out since it is not binding in the
optimum. The first order conditions for the optimization problem are given as follows:






(Ct+1 + ε), t = q, . . . , 20, (16)
Given that in the last period the subject optimally consumes all of his financial wealth and






Zt + Aq (17)














Instructions - Treatment 2
Welcome! You are now taking part in an individual decision making experiment financed
by the CentER research institute. If you read the following instructions carefully, you can
earn a considerable amount of money, depending on your decisions and chance.
The experiment consists of two parts. The choices that you make in the first part do
not affect your payoff in the second part. Similarly, your choices in the second part have
no effect on your payoff in the first part. Your payoff from the first part and the second
part will be added up and paid to you in cash privately at the end of the session. After
the first part is over, you will receive a new set of instructions for the second part. The
following summarizes the experiment:
• Part1
– The experimenter reads the instructions for part 1 aloud.
– You answer the questions at the end of this document.
– When you are ready, begin part 1 (on the computer).
– After part 1 is finished, wait for the instructions for part 2.
• Part 2
– The experimenter reads the instructions for part 2 aloud.
– When you are ready, begin part 2 (on the computer).
– Fill out the questionnaire (on the computer).
– You receive your payment.
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After both parts are over, please remain seated and wait for the announcement of
the experimenter. Once all participants complete the experiment, the experimenter will
read the computer-terminal numbers of the participants aloud one by one. When your
computer-terminal number is announced, please walk up to the experimenter and receive
your payment. Your personal payment information will only be revealed to you. Please
leave the instructions and seat number on your desk when you leave.
Every participant receives the same information and is reading the same instructions.
If you have a question during any stage of the experiment please raise your hand. We will
answer your question privately. Neither your question nor the answer will be announced
aloud to the other participants in this room.
Please do not communicate with the other participants during the experiment! If this
rule is violated, we shall have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.
Part 1
The task in part 1 consists of a maximum of 20 periods. Depending on chance, your
experiment may last for less than 20 periods. At the beginning of each period you may
receive some tokens, which are added to your token stock. In each period you can convert
a part of your token stock to money (Euros). At the end of the experiment, these Euros
will be added up and paid to you in cash.
The number of tokens that you may receive in each period depends on the scenario you
choose. In Figure 1, you see the four possible scenarios for the first part of the experiment.
For example, if you choose scenario C, you will receive 1800 tokens from periods 1 to 12,
594 tokens in period 13 etc. However, as will be explained below, whether you actually
receive these tokens depends on whether you will survive until that period.
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Figure 1
Period Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D
1 2000 1900 1800 1700
2 2000 1900 1800 1700
3 2000 1900 1800 1700
4 2000 1900 1800 1700
5 2000 1900 1800 1700
6 2000 1900 1800 1700
7 2000 1900 1800 1700
8 2000 1900 1800 1700
9 2000 1900 1800 1700
10 2000 1900 1800 1700
11 2000 1900 1800 1700
12 2000 1900 1800 1700
13 0 297 594 891
14 0 255 510 765
15 0 213 426 639
16 0 171 342 513
17 0 129 258 387
18 0 87 174 261
19 0 45 90 135
20 0 3 6 9
First you have to decide on the scenario, by clicking on the corresponding radio button.
If you would like to choose scenario A, you should click on the corresponding radio button
and then click Next. Once you click Next, this decision cannot be undone later on, so
think carefully before you decide. After this, you will proceed to period 1 and make your
first conversion decision.
Before you make your first conversion decision, you will observe the number of tokens
that you will receive at the beginning of each period. This information will be available to
you throughout the experiment.
The part of your token stock which you do not convert can be converted in a later
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For example, if you convert 500 tokens this will yield 0.53. This graph will be available
to you throughout the experiment. In each period you have to decide how many tokens
you want to convert. Only converted tokens count towards earnings at the end of the
experiment. The following examples demonstrate some of the basic rules of the experiment.
Conversion Screen
• Example 1 :
Suppose a participant has reached period 10, as indicated by the X to the left of period
number 10. At the end of period 9, she had 3,900 remaining tokens. At the beginning of
period 10, she receives 200 new tokens. So in total she has 3,900 + 200 = 4,100 tokens. Out
of these 4,100 tokens, she may choose to convert any amount between 0 and 4,100 (0 and
4,100 are included). Let us say that she chooses to convert 500 tokens, which, as can be
seen from Figure 2, yields 0.53. This amount is listed under the Period Earnings column
in Figure 3. She will have 4,100 - 500 = 3,600 remaining tokens at the end of period 10.





    ... ... ... 
 
9 1 in 12 2000
X 10 1 in 11 200
 
11 1 in 10 800
 
 Old Total Converted Period
 Tokens Tokens Tokens Earnings
   
 





 3000 5000 1100 € 0.61
 
 3900 4100 500 € 0.53
 
































Consider the case described in example 1. If, in period 10, the participant chooses to
convert 3,000 tokens instead of 500 tokens, this will yield 0.70 (see Figure 4).
Figure 5 depicts the details if the participant converts 3,000 tokens. In this case, she





    ... ... ... 
 
9 1 in 12 2000
X 10 1 in 11 200
 
11 1 in 10 800
 
 Old Total Converted Period
 Tokens Tokens Tokens Earnings
   
 




 3000 5000 1100 € 0.61
 
 3900 4100 3000 € 0.70
 








of period 11, she will have a total of 1,100 + 800 = 1,900 tokens, which can be converted
to money later on.
Calculator
Before you decide how many tokens you want to convert in a period, you can use the graph
(Figure 2). You can also use the calculator which will be situated at the right-hand section
of the decision screen: You can enter any non-negative number and click Calculate to find
Figure 6
 
out the payment that corresponds to the given number of tokens. For example, if you enter
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1200 and click Calculate, the calculator will return 0.62 under the Euros column. If you
enter 5300 and click Calculate the calculator will return 0.74 under the Euros column.
Once you make your final decision, you can enter the number of tokens that you want
to convert in the current period. After you click the Confirm button, your decision cannot
be undone. You will proceed to the next screen.
Next Screen : Survival Screen
Part 1 of the experiment will go on for at least 8 and at most 20 periods. When the
experiment ends, it is said to be Terminated. If the experiment is not terminated in a
given period, you proceed to the next period. This is referred to as Survival.
You will proceed to the survival screen after you have made your conversion decision.
Up until period 8, you certainly survive to the next period. From period 8 onwards, there
is a possibility that you do not proceed to the next period. For example, in period 8,
your chance to survive to the next period (period 9) is 12 in 13. In other words, in period
8, there is a 1 in 13 chance that the experiment will be terminated after you make the
conversion decision. In order to visualize this probability better, consider the following
case:
Let us say that there is an urn with 13 balls: 12 blue balls and 1 red ball. We have such
an urn here in the room. (See the demonstration) Each ball in the urn is equally likely to
be drawn.
Suppose that you are in period 8, where your survival chance is 12 in 13. This means
that, at the end of period 8, you draw a ball from this urn and if it turns out to be a red
one, this part of the experiment is over for you. In this case, you will not make any more
decisions, until the end of the experiment. However, if it turns out to be a blue one you
will survive to the next period. In this case the chance to survive to the next period is
equal to 12 in 13. The chance of termination is 1 in 13.
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Figure 7
Period Survival Chance Termination Chance
to the Next Period
Period 1 Certainly survive
Period 2 Certainly survive
Period 3 Certainly survive
Period 4 Certainly survive
Period 5 Certainly survive
Period 6 Certainly survive
Period 7 Certainly survive
Period 8 12 in 13 1 in 13
Period 9 11 in 12 1 in 12
Period 10 10 in 11 1 in 11
Period 11 9 in 10 1 in 10
Period 12 8 in 9 1 in 9
Period 13 7 in 8 1 in 8
Period 14 6 in 7 1 in 7
Period 15 5 in 6 1 in 6
Period 16 4 in 5 1 in 5
Period 17 3 in 4 1 in 4
Period 18 2 in 3 1 in 3
Period 19 1 in 2 1 in 2
Period 20 Certainly terminate
Let us say that you picked the blue ball and survived to period 9. After you have made
a decision in period 9, you will once again proceed to the survival screen. Because you
have already drawn a blue ball from the urn, it now contains 12 balls: 11 blue balls and 1
red ball. Therefore, the survival chance is 11 in 12 and the termination chance is 1 in 12.
If you draw again a blue ball in period 9, you will survive to period 10. In this period the
urn contains 11 balls: 10 blue balls and 1 red ball. The survival and termination chances
are given in Figure 7.
As you can see the experiment lasts at least 8 periods. At the end of period 19,
the survival chance is 1 in 2. At the end of period 20, your experiment is terminated
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with certainty. Note that the choice of the scenario has no effect on the survival and
termination chances. That is, the survival and termination chances that are listed on
Figure 7 are independent of the scenario chosen.
Instead of the experimenter drawing a ball from the urn at the end of each period, the
computer will perform this task. After you click Draw you will be directed to a screen
where you can see the result of the random draw. If the randomly drawn ball turns out to
be red, this part of your experiment will be terminated. If it turns out to be blue, you will
proceed to the next period. After everyone is finished with this part of the experiment,
you will proceed to part 2.
You may have some unconverted tokens at the time of termination. These unconverted
tokens will be lost. These tokens do not carry on to part 2. You will only earn money for
the tokens that you have converted before termination. Finally, in the following table you
can observe the survival chances, termination chances and scenarios side by side.
Before you begin
Before you begin, please take your time and think carefully about the decisions that you
will make in the first part. Remember that once you confirm a decision you cannot go back
and change it.
Also remember that tokens yield a monetary payment only when they are converted. In
other words, tokens which have not been converted before the termination of the experiment
do not yield monetary payment.
Before you make any decisions you will be asked to fill in a form on the next page.
Please, do not proceed to the experiment, unless you can easily answer the questions on
this page. Also, on this page, you can write about your thoughts and plans before you
begin. Once you finish the first part of the experiment, please remain seated and wait for
the new set of instructions.
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Figure 8
Period New Tokens New Tokens New Tokens New Tokens Survival Chance Termination Chance
(Scenario A) (Scenario B) (Scenario C) (Scenario D) to the Next Period
1 2000 1900 1800 1700 Certainly survive
2 2000 1900 1800 1700 Certainly survive
3 2000 1900 1800 1700 Certainly survive
4 2000 1900 1800 1700 Certainly survive
5 2000 1900 1800 1700 Certainly survive
6 2000 1900 1800 1700 Certainly survive
7 2000 1900 1800 1700 Certainly survive
8 2000 1900 1800 1700 12 in 13 1 in 13
9 2000 1900 1800 1700 11 in 12 1 in 12
10 2000 1900 1800 1700 10 in 11 1 in 11
11 2000 1900 1800 1700 9 in 10 1 in 10
12 2000 1900 1800 1700 8 in 9 1 in 9
13 0 297 594 891 7 in 8 1 in 8
14 0 255 510 765 6 in 7 1 in 7
15 0 213 426 639 5 in 6 1 in 6
16 0 171 342 513 4 in 5 1 in 5
17 0 129 258 387 3 in 4 1 in 4
18 0 87 174 261 2 in 3 1 in 3
19 0 45 90 135 1 in 2 1 in 2
20 0 3 6 9 Certainly terminate
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• Part1
– The experimenter reads the instructions for part 1 aloud.
– You answer the questions at the end of this document.
– When you are ready, begin part 1 (on the computer).
– After part 1 is finished, wait for the instructions for part 2.
Questions
1. x= chance of reaching period 12, given that you have already reached period 11. y=
chance of reaching period 13, given that you have already reached period 12. What
are x and y? Which one is greater, x or y?
Answer:
2. x= chance of reaching period 14, given that you have already reached period 13. y=
chance of reaching period 19, given that you have already reached period 18. What
are x and y? Which one is greater, x or y?
Answer:
3. Fill in the empty slots , [ ]
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Period Termination New Old Total Converted Period Remaining 
 
Probability Tokens Tokens Tokens Tokens Earnings Tokens 
 
 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 






 11 1 in 10 1000 3000 [           ] 500 [            ] [           ] 
       
 
 X 12 1 in 9 1000 [           ] [           ] [           ] € 0.70 [           ] 
       
 
 13 1 in 8 800 [           ] [           ] ... ... ... 
       
 
  
Before you begin, please state your thoughts and plans (Part 1):
 
 
If you have answered these three questions please raise your hand. We will check your
answers. If they are all correct you can start with part 1 of the experiment.
Please also raise your hand if you have any questions later.
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Part 2
After termination of the first experiment, you will proceed to the lottery screen. Here you
will be asked to choose between two lotteries. For each row in the lottery table, you will
be asked to choose between option A and option B. There are 10 rows in the table so in
this part you will make a total of 10 decisions (1 decision for each row):
Figure 9
Option A Option B
1 1/10 chance for e2.00 , 9/10 chance for e1.60 1/10 chance for e3.85 , 9/10 chance for e0.10
2 2/10 chance for e2.00 , 8/10 chance for e1.60 2/10 chance for e3.85 , 8/10 chance for e0.10
3 3/10 chance for e2.00 , 7/10 chance for e1.60 3/10 chance for e3.85 , 7/10 chance for e0.10
4 4/10 chance for e2.00 , 6/10 chance for e1.60 4/10 chance for e3.85 , 6/10 chance for e0.10
5 5/10 chance for e2.00 , 5/10 chance for e1.60 5/10 chance for e3.85 , 5/10 chance for e0.10
6 6/10 chance for e2.00 , 4/10 chance for e1.60 6/10 chance for e3.85 , 4/10 chance for e0.10
7 7/10 chance for e2.00 , 3/10 chance for e1.60 7/10 chance for e3.85 , 3/10 chance for e0.10
8 8/10 chance for e2.00 , 2/10 chance for e1.60 8/10 chance for e3.85 , 2/10 chance for e0.10
9 9/10 chance for e2.00 , 1/10 chance for e1.60 9/10 chance for e3.85 , 1/10 chance for e0.10
10 10/10 chance for e2.00 , 0/10 chance for e1.60 10/10 chance for e3.85 , 0/10 chance for e0.10
For example, consider the first row of the table. Assume that there are 10 balls in an
urn: 9 white balls and 1 black ball. You make a random draw from the urn. In the case of
option A, if you pick a white ball you will earn 1.60 and if you pick the black ball you will
earn 2. In the case of option B, if you pick a white ball you will earn 0.10 and if you pick
the black ball you will earn 3.85. If you are to have either option A or option B, which one
will you choose? After you make your choice, move on to another row and make the same
comparison between option A and option B of that row. As in part 1, in this part draws
will be carried out by the computer.
Once you confirm all your decisions, the computer will pick one of the rows randomly
and play the chosen lottery. The computer is equally likely to choose each row in the table.
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Lets say that it randomly chooses the first row and for the first row you chose option B
rather than option A. The computer will play out option B. That is to say, the computer
will draw a ball randomly from an urn in which there are 9 white balls and 1 black ball.
If it draws a white ball you will earn 0.10 and if it draws the black ball you will earn 3.85.
The monetary payoff that you will earn from this lottery will be added to your payoff from
the first part. This will be your total payoff.
After you finish this part, you will be asked to provide some basic information about
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